Cryptographic encryption scheme for solving the trusted courier problem
  based on metastable excited nuclei by Durt, Thomas & Hermanne, Alex
ar
X
iv
:0
91
0.
31
31
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
6 O
ct 
20
09
Cryptographic encryption scheme for solving the trusted courier problem based on
metastable excited nuclei.
Thomas Durt∗ and Alex Hermanne†
TONA Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
(Dated: January 6, 2019)
Abstract: Quantum cryptography makes it possible to expand a short shared key (of e.g. 256 bits[1]) into an arbitrary
long shared key. The novelty of quantum cryptography is that whenever a spy tries to eavesdrop the communication
he causes disturbances in the transmission of the message. Ultimately this unavoidable disturbance is a consequence
of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that limits the joint knowledge of complementary observables.
Now, a problem remains: in order to initialize quantum key distribution, Alice and Bob need to share a short shared
key in order to be able to identify each other unambiguously. Therefore a trusted courier is needed. We propose in
this paper a solution to the trusted courrier problem that was inspired by quantum cryptography. The idea is to
encode the key that Alice sends to Bob into unstable nuclei in such a way that the message gets revealed only after
the courrier has delivered it to Bob.
In this approach, we replace Heisenberg uncertainties by another type of uncertainty, that characterizes the knowl-
edge of the time at which an unstable nucleus decays. As we shall show, this scheme makes it possible to refresh a
key even in the case that we do not trust the courier who carries the key.
Keywords: Key distribution, radio-isotope elements, confidentiality.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main differences between quantum physics and classical physics is that the quantum theory is an
intrinsically undeterministic theory. This has as a consequence that the knowledge that one can get about quantum
systems is limited, as is expressed by Heisenberg uncertaintites that bound the simultaneous knowledge of conjugate
quantitites such as position and momentum [2, 3]. These uncertainties also limit our ability to control and predetermine
certain properties of quantum systems. For instance, it is impossible to prepare a photonic polarisation state in which
the polarisations are simultaneously predetermined in the linear horizontal-vertical polarisation basis and in the
circular polarisation basis, a feature that plays a key role in the BB84 protocol [4].
Similar uncertainties also limit time and energy [5, 6] with as a consequence that the exact time at which an unstable
radioactive isotope will decay is characterized by an intrinsic uncertainty, of the order of the lifetime of the unstable
isotope.
Such isotopes present numerous medical applications such as PET scan tomography, cancer treatment and so on.
As many other biomedical applications, they generated a specific industry with as a consequence that the technology
in this field is very performant and efficient. One can now, at relatively low costs, select nearly a` la carte the lifetime,
decay mode and the chemical affinities of the radioactive substance that is produced in accelerators, depending on
the requested application.
As the radioactive decay process is an intrinsically stochastic in time process that cannot be controlled from outside,
one can also conceive, as we intend to show in the present paper, a key distribution protocol that exploits this limitation
to the advantage of the authorized transmitters and receivers of the key (Alice and Bob). The basic idea is that if the
lifetime of the radioactive isotope that is used to encode the fresh key is significatively longer than the transit time
between them, the spy (Eve) cannot decipher the key because the decay will most often occur only after the courier
has reached the receiver.
Of course the confidentiality of such a technique is based on the impossibility for Eve to eavesdrop the authorized
users of the cryptographic transmission line outside of the travel period of the courier, but this basic assumption must
be valid in the framework of classical and quantum cryptography as well.
The problem with classical encryption schemes is that nothing prevents Eve to learn the content of the key. She
can always, in principle, mask her interaction afterwards by rewriting a fidel copy of the message and resending it to
the receiver (Bob)[25].
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2In our case, the situation is different because as we shall see in the chapter devoted to security aspects, a part of
the message is revealed during the transit period but either it is ultimately discarded or it is too small to be useful to
Eve, and the rest of the message, the raw key is revealed later, after it has reached Bob and is out of reach for Eve.
Another feature of our protocol is that the raw key is a subset of the originally sent key. This does not menace
the confidentiality of the transmission scheme provided the original key is devoided of meaningful information and
consists of a random series of bits arbitrarily chosen by the sender. After the exchange of the raw key, Alice and
Bob are free to transmit to each other any kind of useful information making use of the Vernam pad [7], as in more
conventional quantum cryptographic distribution schemes[26].
One could object that our approach is unefficient in order to send long keys, but it could be coupled to conventional
Quantum Key Distribution schemes, in order to solve the trusted courier problem that unavoidably appears at the
initialisation process of a secured quantum transmission when Alice and Bob check that they are well who they are
supposed to be, and not a malignous Eve.
II. PROTOCOL FOR KEY DISTRIBUTION THROUGH RADIOACTIVE ENCRYPTION PROCESS.
Let us know describe in detail a protocol for key distribution in which the signal, a random bit, is encrypted with the
help of radioactive atomic nuclei. This protocol (that we shall from now on call the Radioactive Encryption (R-E)
protocol) consists of five distinct steps:
i) Alice produces a substance that contains unstable radioactive nuclei with a well-defined lifetime τD. She dilutes
it ”homeopatically” in order to arrive to a dilution level so low that the probability that (at least) one unstable nucleus
is present in a standard volume (or sample) of say 1 mm3 is of the order of µ with µ significatively smaller than one
(of the order of 10 percent is a reasonable choice as we shall discuss in the next section devoted to security aspects of
the protocol).
Alice also produces a ”twin” substance or placebo that is entirely comparable to the radioactive one (same chemical
ligants, same production scheme excepted that this twin substance is not radioactive). The simplest way to produce
this twin substance is to stock the radioactive one during a time quite longer than the lifetime, so that its radioactivity
has virtually vanished away.
It is important to note at this level that when an atom is excited in a collision with a highly energetic particle
produced in a cyclotron two possible (des)excitation schemes can occur: either the atomic number and/or the mass
number change during the process (which is then a transmutation process) or the nucleus keeps the same amount of
neutrons and protons but gets excited to a metastable state that will decay afterwards within a time of the order of
the life time. It is the second reaction scheme that interests us because when two atoms share the same atomic and
mass numbers all electronic levels are the same and therefore the excited state is in the practice undistinguishible from
the ground state by spectroscopic or non-invasive methods[27]. In the case of metastable excitation on the contrary,
it is only by waiting that the excited state decays and by measuring the products of desintegration that one knows
whether the atom has been excited in the past. Moreover, there is no way to accelerate the desexcitation process
because it involves nucleic degrees of freedom that are so complex that they are not controllable in the practice.
In an irradiation process transmutation processes and metastable excitations occur simultaneously but are charac-
terized by different lifetimes and decay characteristics. Depending on which material is excited (targets of natural
isotopic composition or isotopically enriched targets) and in which conditions (type and energy of bombarding particle,
thickness of target) one can tune the relative weights of the ”metastable decay channel” and of the ”transmutation
channel”. In appendix we provide an explicit example (the case of metastable 117mSn isotopes) in order to show how
one can selectively produce a metastable excited nucleus with a life time of the order of two weeks.
ii) Alice now divides a substrate plate into M pairs of neighbouring cells with M sufficiently high (at least say
1000) so that we enter the domain of validity of the law of large numbers. For instance a standard A4 piece of paper
contains 2400 squared cells of 5 mm side[28]. She spots a standard volume of radioactive substance on one cell chosen
at random in each pair with the convention that say the left cell is attributed the binary value 1 and the right one
the value 0. By doing so she generates a random series of M bits that is physically encrypted on the plate. She
systematically spots a standard volume of the neutral ”twin” substance (placebo) on the remaining cell in each pair.
She finally impregnates the whole plate with a low dilution ”neutral” (placebo) solution in order to avoid that Eve
is able to localize ”empty” cells where no nucleus at all of the isotopic specy that we use for encrypting the message
would be present[29].
iii) She sends the plate to Bob by use of a courier Charles.
Charles can be physically concretized by a company that sends express mail, or a governmental mail company, or
any person that travels from Alice to Bob. In conventional cryptographic schemes, Charles is the weak link of the
protocol. Charles could get bribed, or the mail could get temporarily stolen during the trip without that he notices
its disappearance. Eve could also intercept the letter in the mailbox of Bob before Bob opens it.
3iv) After having received the plate, Bob hides it during a time τB in a safe place where supposedly Eve has no
access, an hypothesis that must be met whichever cryptographic protocol Alice and Bob choose to adopt otherwise it
is no longer worth trying to establish secrecy at all. During that time Bob measures (for instance with a ccd detector
or more simply by enveloping the plate into a photographic film) the occurence of decays which provides him a series
of bits. Supposedly this is done with a spatial precision that is accurate enough in order to allow Bob to differentiate
0 and 1 bits.
The decay time τD must be chosen in order that the following constraints are met:
τD ≤ τB (the ”revelation” time during which Bob waits that the message gets revealed must be larger than or
comparable to the decay time otherwise too few secret bits get revealed to Bob).
Moreover it is reasonable to assume that the time τP that elapses between the production of the radioelement in
the cyclotron and the encryption of the message by Alice, as well as the transportation time τT during which Charles
carries the message from Alice to Bob are smaller than the decay time:
τP < τD and τT < τD (the expedition time is smaller than the decay time otherwise too many bits are lost underway
to Bob).
Similar constraints are actually already fulfilled in the case of medical applications, where moreover τD itself may
not be too long in order to avoid to expose the person who absorbs the radioactive substance to a too high dosis of
radiation.
v) Finally, Bob notes which bits appeared during the time τB . This constitutes the raw key. Bob communicates to
Alice on a public channel the list that contains the labels of all the pairs for which he observed that a bit was revealed,
without of course precising which bit it was (so to say without precising whether the location was ”right” or ”left”).
At this level Alice and Bob share a key with a very high level of confidentiality. If certain errors appear (due for
instance to an accidental collision of a piece of the photographic plate with a cosmic ray), it is still possible for Alice
and Bob to suppress them thanks to classical techniques (reconciliation [10, 11]). Also, one can estimate an upper
bound on Eve’s information as we shall see in the next section. Taking account of the existence of a non-zero but low
probability that Eve possesses some information about the raw key Alice and Bob can in principle still let diminish
this probability and reach an arbitrary level of confidentiality thanks to another classical post-treatment of the data
called privacy amplification [10, 11, 12].
It is not our goal to describe these classical post-treatments here. They require an authentified but not necessarily
confidential classical line of transmission between Alice and Bob[30]. They are well-known and are daily implemented
in the framework of quantum cryptography.
III. SECURITY OF THE R-E PROTOCOL.
Some stochasticity is present in the R-E protocol from the beginning because it is not realistic to assume that
Alice can create standardized samples with exactly one unstable nucleus in each sample. This is comparable to the
current situation in quantum cryptography where high rate single photon sources, when they exist, are not of common
use. Instead of sending exactly one photon at a time, in most realistic applications, the source is a damped laser
source that sends pulses with a Poisson distributed population. In order to avoid repetition (redundancy) of the
encoded information that could potentially open the door to menacing eavesdropping strategies (like the so-called
beamsplitting [11] or translucent attacks [13] that we shall consider next), the average number of photons by pulse is
chosen to be low (of the order of 10 percent).
It would be extremely difficult in practice to control exactly how many excited nuclei are present in each sample but
the R-E protocol remains operational provided the distribution of the number of unstable nuclei by standard volume
is stable throughout time. This requirement can be satisfactorily met in the practice because biomedical applications
require a very accurate dosimetry of radioactive elements and obey high standards of quality and control, for obvious
safety reasons. Without loss of generality we shall consider in the following that the distribution of the number of
unstable nuclei is Poissonian so that P (N) = µ
N
N ! · exp−µ. In the case that the distribution is not exactly Poissonian
it is still possible to adapt the protocol.
In any case, due to the fact that a mixing process occurs during the ”homeopatic” dilution stage, we expect no gross
departure from the Poisson distribution in the sense that when the probability P0 that a sample does not contain any
radioactive nucleus is of the order of 90 percent, the probability that it contains one, two, three ... such nuclei is of
the order of 10, 1, 0.1 ... percent.
It is important that the dosimetric protocol is always realized in repeatable conditions so that one is able to calibrate
properly the populations of empty samples, single nucleus samples, two nuclei samples ... once for all.
This guarantees that the redundancy of the encrypted information is limited: the probability that a bit contains
more than one excited nucleus relatively to the probability that it contains at least one excited nucleus is of the order
4of 12µ, and the probability that a bit contains more than two excited nucleus relatively to the probability that it
contains at least one excited nucleus is of the order of 16µ
2, close to 0.001 when µ ≈ 0.1.
It is then reasonable to assume that non-empty pulses only consist of singlet and pairs. In analogy with so-called
beamsplitting [11] or translucent attacks [13] where a spy taps an optically encrypted communication by beamsplitting
the signal with an asymmetric beamsplitter, keeping only a very small fraction and resending the rest to Bob, Eve
could measure a bit value without being noticed. This occurs whenever the information is encrypted in a pair of
excited nuclei and that exactly one among the two excited nuclei decays during the transportation time τT . Eve’s
strategy consists of keeping a memory of the single decays that occur during the transportation time and waiting
until Bob publically communicate to Alice which bits he observed.
The probability Ptranslucent that this strategy is payful (which means that Eve’s and Bob’s bits coincide), with µ
taken to be a small parameter, obeys the relation
Ptranslucent ≈ µ
2!
· 2 · (1− exp(−τP + τT
τD
)) · exp(−τP + τT
τD
) · (1 − exp(− τB
τD
)), (1)
(where we also assumed for simplicity that the probability that no decay occurs over the full duration of the protocol
is very low. This probability is of the order of exp(− τP+τT+τBτD ) and is small provided τP + τT + τB > τD.).
Let us now consider other possible attacks, making the most conservative hypotheses about Eve’s abilities. The
optimal strategy for her is to wait until the end of the travel and to eavesdrop the message just before Bob receives it.
We shall assume that Eve is able to check whether a nucleus decayed by non-invasive methods, with maximal efficiency
(ǫEve = 1) and in a very short time, and also to erase the substance on the plate and replace it by a radioactive sample
without leaving trace of her intervention. We shall even assume that she possesses a ”bright” source of excited nuclei
meaning hereby that she can produce a standard volume of the substance with at least one excited nucleus in each
sample in such a way that the relative population of single excited nuclei, pairs, triplets and so on exactly mimicks
the relative populations produced by Alice (excepted that, in the case of Alice, non-radioactive, neutral, samples are
also produced with a probability close to 90 percent).
This allows Eve to perform an analog of so-called opaque attacks where she replaces ”fainted” bits by bright
bits [13, 14] in order to increase the populations of bits that she intercepts-resends relatively to the population of
bits that Bob receives. Of course by doing so Eve alters the statistics of the results and in order to mask her
intervention different strategies are possible depending on the mechanisms of control exerted by Bob. There are two
possible scenarios depending on the ability of Bob to check, at the arrival of the message, whether a nucleus decayed
underway.
a) If he can do so, Bob checks which nuclei are decayed at the arrival of the plate, before he waits that the other
nuclei decay. For instance this can be done by enveloping the plate into a photographic film before Alice gives it to
Charles. Bob can then develop the film and communicate to Alice the result of his observation by a public channel
so that they discard those bits in the following.
The best strategy for Eve is then to replace some already decayed samples by ”bright” samples that will decay with
probability unity instead of 1 − P0 ≈ 1 − exp(−µ) ≈ 10%. We shall even conservatively assumes that Eve can do so
without affecting the relative populations of singlets, pairs, triplets and so on [15]. The problem remains anyhow that
by doing so Eve diminishes the number of already decayed samples that Bob measures when he receives the plate
from Charles, and this could be noticed by Bob unless this departure agrees with the typical size of the statistical
fluctuations that unavoidably occur in such circumstances. When the sample is long enough, these fluctuations obey
the law of large numbers and their relative size decreases like the inverse of the square root of the lenght of the sample.
Therefore, one can estimate an upper bound on the information possibly possessed by Eve. It is worth noting that
even if Bob’s non-invasive check is not perfectly accurate (for instance because the photographic plate did not react
although a nucleus decayed, what could arrive with nonzero probability), one can still estimate, knowing what is the
probability ǫBob for Bob to reveal the trace of a decay process, a safe upper bound for Eve’s information, making use
of the law of large numbers (here we shall also conservatively assume that Eve’s detectors are ideal: ǫEve = 1).
The reasoning goes as follows. The probability P that a metastable nucleus decays before it arrives to Bob
(where we also assumed for simplicity that the duration of the full protocol is large in comparison to τD) is equal to
1 − exp(− τP+τTτD ). When the population of excited nuclei per encrypted bit is Poissonian of average µ, that Bob’s
efficiency in revealing whether or not a nucleus has decayed is equal to ǫbob and that Alice sends one nucleus, the
probability that it is observed by Bob is Poissonian with an average equal to ǫBobµ.
Let us assume that Alice sends N bits which means that more or less N · µ excited nuclei are sent, with µ taken to
be a small parameter. The number of decayed nuclei that are present when Bob receives the message from Charles
obeys a Bernouilli binomial distribution of mean N · µ · P . Its variance is then of the order of N · µ · P · (1 − P ).
A safety threshold of five standard deviations ensures that Eve knows at most 5.
√
N · µ · P · (1− P ) bits while Bob
knows in average N · (1 − P ) · (1 − exp(−ǫBobµ)) ≈ N · (1 − P ) · ǫBobµ of them (those that decay after Bob receives
5the message). The probability Pintercept−resend that Eve knows Bob’s bit by such an intercept-resend strategy is thus
(with a safety margin of five standard deviations) upperly bounded:
Pintercept−resend <
5 ·
√
µP
(1−P )·(1−exp(−ǫBobµ))2√
N
≈
5 ·
√
P
(1−P )·ǫ2
Bob
µ√
N
. (2)
b) It can be that Bob does even not check whether a nucleus decayed underway by non-invasive methods (for one
or another reason, for instance because it would be too expensive to do so) and has to wait during a time τB before
he looks at the plate. Then Bob knows that, even in that case, Eve possibly knows at most a fraction P of the bits,
with
P ≈ 1− exp(−τP + τT
τD
), (3)
that she eventually replaced by bright bits[31].
Actually the opaque attacks and translucent attacks described above (2,3,1) are not fully independent but we
can conservatively bound the probability that Eve knows a bit by the sum of the probability to know a bit by a
translucent attack and the probability to know it by an opaque attack. Now, one can easily convince oneself that
Ptranslucent, Pintercept−resend and P , the three upper bounds on the probabilities of succesful eavesdropping strategies
by Eve that were estimated above, go to zero when τP+τTτD goes to zero, with τB comparable to or larger than τD.
In principle, Eve’s information can thus be made arbitrarily small by letting increase τD and τB, keeping τP and
τT fixed or by letting decrease τP and τT , freezing the values of τD and τB. Of course those delays cannot be varied
entirely at will, but there exists a large spectrum of metastable radio elements of which the time life varies from some
hours to some days that could meet the constraints, depending essentially on the production and transportation times
τP and τT .
In any case the ratio between Eve’s information and Bob’s information about Alice’s originally encrypted key (or
rather about the subset of it that has not been discarded at the end of the process) is upperly bounded. Depending
on the ability of Bob ǫBob to check whether a nucleus decayed by non-invasive methods and of the choice of τD, τB,
τP and τT , this ratio can become small enough so that the reconciliation protocol and the process of amplification of
privacy are succesful and finally allow Alice and Bob to generate a secret key with an arbitrarily high guarantee of
confidentiality.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS.
One could object that our protocol is not specifically quantum. It is indeed so that nothing guarantees that the
bits are encrypted in non-commuting bases (roughly speaking they are classical bits corresponding to the dichotomy
excited (unstable)-neutral (stable)).
Now, in principle, classical bits can be perfectly cloned [16, 17] so that it is possible to intercept-resend them with
a probability arbitrarily close to unity. If Eve had the opportunity to measure unambiguously whether a nucleus is
excited or not she could intercept resend the signal with a probability close to unity without being noticed. If that was
possible, this would mean that one could accelerate the decay process of unstable nuclei significatively in a relatively
short time (of the order of one day). This would also mean that the problem of radio-active waste would be potentially
solved. No progress was made in this direction during the last fifty years, although the environmental implications of
such a progress would be overwhelming...As far as we know, to the contrary of excited electronic states, no stimulated
radioactive decay is possible.
To formulate it clearly, our basic assumption is that one cannot accelerate the decay rate of radio-elements by any
mean. At first sight this impossibility is seemingly more of technological nature than of fundamental nature in which
case it could be overcome in the futute but as we shall argue now, nothing is less sure.
Firstly, it has been empirically confirmed that unstable quantum systems obey time-energy uncertainty relations
(for instance the uncertainty in energy of a spectroscopic ray times its lifetime is always larger than Planck’s constant).
Considered so the impossibility to force an unstable system to decay at a certain time would be due to its intrinsic
quantum spread in time. We use the conditional form here because the status of time-energy uncertainty relations
remains today a somewhat polemical and controversial subject [6, 18].
Secondly, the security of our protocol can also be seen as a consequence of the fundamental impossibility to reach
perfect control and/or predictability of a complex system.
Indeed, the temporal evolution of a metastable nucleus is a many body problem for which our knowledge is per
se limited: we are unable to know exactly what is the initial state of the system; we have only partial knowledge
6about the interactions that occur when a proton collides a nuclei and also between the protons and neutrons inside
the nuclei (it is commonly accepted that hadrons are bound states of triplets of quarks, but relatively few is known
about the effective interaction that takes place between such three-body objects). To conclude, in order to be able
to influence the behavior of such excited nuclei, we should be able to prepare them and to predict their evolution in
time with nearly arbitrary accuracy, and also to interact with them in a nearly perfectly controllable way.
Considered so our proposal presents a level of confidentiality that is intermediate between the one offered in
conventional classical encryption schemes based on the length of the computational time necessary for breaking the
key and the one offered in quantum cryptography that is based on the lack of predictability-measurability imposed
by Heisenberg’s uncertainties[32].
Besides, our protocol shares some common points with the protocol proposed by Goldenberg and Vaidman in
their paper of 1995 entitled Quantum Cryptography Based on Orthogonal States [20] in which although the bits are
not encrypted in non-orthogonal states (non-commuting bases) the protocol is safe due to the fact that Eve has no
simultaneous access to both components of the signal. During the time that the first component flies to Bob, the
second component is stuck in Alice’s lab; during the time that the second component flies to Bob, the first one is
already safe in Bob’s lab.
The security of Goldenberg-Vaidman’s protocol was, in last resort, not a consequence of quantum uncertainties,
but rather of causality. In other words, in order to break the code, Eve would have had to dispose of a time machine.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by time-energy uncertainties, in order to break our code, Eve would have
to dispose of Maxwell’s demons which like time machines seemingly belong to the domain of fantasy rather than to
the real world...[33]
BB84 protocol with metastable states.
If we consider metastable electronic states instead of radioelements, it is no longer so that Eve is unable to measure
whether a state is excited or not in a time lapse shorter than the lifetime of the resonance, because in principle she
could coherently guide the metastable state to an unstable state of quite shorter lifetime, with a laser field (induced
transition) or with an electric field (quenching). Then she can measure in principle the photon that is emitted when
this unstable state decays.
The essential difference between electronic states and nucleic states is the complexity of the system that explains
why it is not possible, today, to accelerate the decay process of a nucleic metastable state.
Now, it could be that in the future one becomes able to manipulate nuclei as easily as electrons, in which case the
safety of our protocol would be menaced. In such circumstances it is still possible to restore confidentiality by making
use of the quantum degrees of freedom of the system. Let us denote |ψ0〉 the ground state of the nucleus and |ψ1〉 the
excited metastable state. We could encode in principle a qubit in a single nucleus, and use two bases of encryption, for
instance the {|ψ0, 〉|ψ1〉} basis and the {|ψ˜0, 〉|ψ˜1〉} with {|ψ˜0 = 1√
2
(|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉) and {|ψ˜1 = 1√
2
(|ψ0〉−|ψ1〉). Formally
such a protocol is equivalent to BB84 protocol [4], and in this case confidentiality is guaranteed by Heisenberg
uncertainties.
The advantage of encrypting the signal in metastable states is the longevity of the encryption, which also means
that nuclei can be seen as a quantum memory[34]. It could provide an alternative way to refresh a key by quantum
key distribution in the case that no conventional transmission line (optical fiber, aerial transmission or else) would be
available.
It also brings an original solution to the ”trusted courier problem”.
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Appendix: production of a metastable Sn isotope of halflife 13.6 days.
By bombarding natural Sn (composed of nine stable isotopes with mass between 112 and 124) with high energy
protons, many radioactive nuclides of the elements Sb, Sn, In and Cd with half lives longer than 1 min can be
formed (for instance more than 50 when the energy of the protons is 65 Mev [23]). Excitation functions, expressing
the probability of the production in function of the particle energy, for 13 among them, all emitting γ-rays with
energy above 100 keV, are documented in Ref.[23]. One of these radionuclides is the metastable state 117mSn of
the stable, naturally occurring, isotope 117Sn. The decay is characterized by a halflife T1/2 = 13.6 days[35] and the
7desexcitation from the metastable state to the ground state occurs through a cascade emission of a 156.0 keV γ-ray
to an intermediate excited level followed by a 158.56keV γ-ray.
These transitions are characterized by high internal conversion rates which mean that the energy of the γ-rays is
converted to electronic excitation states with high probability, which in turn induces several X-lines with energies
between 25 and 29 keV.
The shape of the excitation function suggests that only a small fraction of the metastable state is formed by inelastic
(p,p) scattering on 117Sn while the largest part is due to (p,pxn) reactions on 118,119,120 Sn. The contribution of
decay of 117Sb (only 0.07 % decays to 117mSn) can be neglected. For incident protons of 30MeV (a standard value
for commercially available isotope production machines) a thick target yield of 1MBq/µAh can be expected[36].
Contaminating radio- or stable nuclides of Sb and In can be removed by a standard chemical separation step shortly
after the end of bombardment. The production of the possibly disturbing co-produced Sn isotopes 113Sn (T1/2 =
115.1 days); 119mSn (T1/2 = 293 days), 121
mSn (T1/2 = 50 years) and 123Sn (T1/2 = 129.2 days) can be limited
or avoided by working with enriched 118Sn targets. Moreover, isotopes with a long lifetime would be present in
the placebo substance in comparable proportions. Finally, it has to be remarked that for 117mSn production an
alternative to charged particle activation is (n,γ) caption in a fission reactor on enriched 116Sn targets.
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